Abstract -Saving rates display considerable variation across countries and over time. This paper investigates empirically the policy and nonpolicy factors behind these saving disparities using a large, crosscountry, time-series data set and following an encompassing approach including a number of relevant private saving determinants. The paper extends the literature in several dimensions. It uses the largest data set on aggregate saving assembled to date and explores both national and private saving determinants. It uses panel instrumental-variable techniques to correct for endogeneity and heterogeneity. Finally, it performs a variety of robustness checks to changes in estimation procedures, data samples, and model specification.
I. Introduction
O VER THE LAST three decades saving rates have experienced a marked divergence which has been particularly dramatic within the developing world: Saving rates have risen steadily in East Asia, stagnated in Latin America, and fallen in sub-Saharan Africa. These regional saving disparities have been closely matched by diverging growth experiences: Across world regions, higher saving rates tend to be correlated with higher income growth.
This large variation in saving performance across countries and over time raises a number of questions. Why do saving rates differ so much across countries and time periods? How much do public policies contribute to these saving disparities, in comparison to other structural and nonpolicy saving determinants?
From the policy perspective are serious questions about the size-and sometimes even about the sign-of the effects of policy variables on saving rates. How effective is fiscal policy in raising national saving? Does financial liberalization-by raising interest rates, encouraging consumer and housing lending, and raising financial depth-inhibit or encourage private saving? Does foreign lending crowd out national saving? Or perhaps growth-enhancing policies (such as macro stabilization and structural reform) would be more effective in raising saving through higher income and growth than any direct saving incentive?
In this paper we address the above questions empirically by exploiting what we believe is the largest cross-country, time-series, macroeconomic data set on saving and related variables that has been assembled to date. The data set is unique because of various features. 1 First, it encompasses industrial and developing countries and covers nearly thirty years of data. Second, it provides alternative saving measures (for the nation, the central government, the public sector, and the private sector, separately; unadjusted and adjusted for inflation-related capital gains and losses). Third, it has been subject to extensive quality checks, which, among other things, allow us to identify problematic observations and set them aside if necessary.
The objective of the paper is to use this large data set to establish the stylized facts concerning the effects on the private saving rate of its key policy and nonpolicy determinants that are identified in the literature. To do this, the paper estimates a variety of empirical equations for the private saving rate. Private saving regressions are estimated for a worldwide sample of countries, as well as separately for subsamples of industrial and developing countries. For completeness, the paper also presents regression results for the national saving rate. In order to encompass a broad range of saving determinants (and hence theoretical views about saving), we use a variety of reduced-form linear specifications rather than one narrow model of saving derived from first principles. 2 We believe that this approach provides a useful first step to identify the key empirical regularities in need of structural explanation.
We estimate our empirical equations using various panel data procedures, paying particular attention to the issues of simultaneity and country heterogeneity that are mostly ignored in earlier studies. Specifically, our large panel data set allows the use of ''internal'' instruments to correct for these problems, which permits us to make some progress towards drawing inferences on the effects of policy and nonpolicy variables on private saving rates, rather than merely describing their association.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II summarizes briefly recent cross-country empirical studies of private saving. Section III presents our empirical strategy, describing the data set and estimation approach. Section IV reports the econometric results for the private (and national) saving rate using a variety of samples, regression specifications, and estimation techniques. The paper closes with brief concluding remarks.
II. Determinants of Private Saving Rates in Previous
Panel Studies Table 1 summarizes potential determinants of private saving rates and lists their expected signs according to consumption theory. 3 A number of recent empirical studies have estimated the effect of various economic and demographic variables on private saving rates in cross-country, time-series (panel) samples. To provide a summary on the empirical evidence related to each of the saving determinants under consideration, the last column in table 1 lists the qualitative results of six recent studies using large-panel data samples. They comprise studies for both industrial and developing countries (Masson, Bayoumi, and Samiei (1995) ; Edwards (1996) ; Bailliu and Reisen (1998) ), for industrialcountry samples (Haque, Pesaran, and Sharma (1999) ), and for developing-country samples (Corbo and SchmidtHebbel (1991) ; Dayal-Ghulati and Thimann (1997) ).
The common feature of these papers is that they are based on reduced-form saving equations, not necessarily derived The qualitative results listed in the last column of this table summarize significant signs of saving regressors in the corresponding tables and columns of the following six studies: 1. Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (1991) (table 4) ; 2. Masson, Bayoumi, and Samiei (1995) (table 2, ''restricted model'' column); 3. Edwards (1996) (table 2, column 5); 4. Dayal-Ghulati and Thimann (1997) (table 4, column 2); 5. Bailliu and Reisen (1998) (table 1, columns 3 and 4); and 6. Haque, Pesaran, and Sharma (1999) (table 6, columns 4 and 5). Significant coefficient signs are identified by a plus or a minus. Results identified by a zero mean either an insignificant coefficient in the corresponding column of the original study or, when the variable is omitted from the particular specification reported in the column, a significant or insignificant variable in a different column of the same table. Each study is identified in the table by the corresponding number in parentheses.
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THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS from first principles. 4 They differ widely in other dimensions, as they are also based on different sample periods and countries as well as on different model specifications and estimation techniques. Not surprisingly, only a few saving determinants appear to be consistently significant across different studies and with their estimated signs according to theory. They include the terms of trade, domestic and foreign borrowing constraints, fiscal policy variables, and pension system variables. Regarding other determinants for which consumption theories either differ regarding their signs or point toward ambiguous signs (as in the case of income growth and interest rates), these empirical studies differ widely. They differ also in reported significance levels of variables for which theories tend to agree on expected signs, such as income level, inflation, and demographic dependency ratios.
III. Empirical Strategy
The above empirical studies capture a number of factors relevant to saving decisions, but they vary considerably in terms of data coverage and quality, empirical specification, and econometric procedure. Our primary objective here is to extend this literature by providing a comprehensive characterization of the empirical association between private saving rates and a broad range of potentially important saving determinants using the best available data. To do this, we complement and extend previous work along three dimensions. First, we use the largest set of consistent macroeconomic data on saving assembled to date. Second, we adopt a reduced-form approach encompassing a variety of saving determinants identified in the literature, rather than adhering to one particular, narrow, structural model. Third, we employ a variety of estimation methods but focus our attention on estimators that attempt to control for heterogeneity and simultaneity, two problems that likely plaque most previous empirical studies.
A. The Data
Our basic data set draws from the saving database recently constructed at the World Bank and described in detail by Loayza et al. (1998a) . To our knowledge, this database represents the largest macroeconomic data set on saving and related variables presently available. It comprises a maximum of 150 countries and spans the years 1965 to 1994. The data have been subject to extensive consistency checks; hence, they also represent an important improvement in terms of quality relative to other existing data sets. 5 The data set excludes the countries for which we found inconsistencies in basic National Account, fiscal, and financial data. These data limitations prevented the construction of reliable saving measures, their disaggregation into public and private saving, and/or the calculation of the inflation adjustments for the latter. For some of the key variables in this paper, the effective data coverage in countries and years is therefore limited. Nevertheless, for the ''core'' private saving regression, presented below, we initially count with 1,254 complete observations spanning the years 1966-1995. From this initial sample, we decided to exclude the observations corresponding to episodes of high inflation. We base this decision on the fact that high inflation distorts severely measured public and private saving (particularly the inflation-adjusted saving measures). 6 Moreover, in general high inflation renders National Account statistics largely unreliable. For practical purposes, we set a threshold of Ϯ50% annual inflation. We apply the same threshold to the real interest rate, which in cases of high inflation is mostly driven by inflation. For the core specification, these data adjustments lead to the direct loss of 49 observations. 7 In order to achieve a minimum time-series dimension, as well as to reserve sufficient observations to implement our instrumental-variable estimators described below, we limit our sample coverage to those countries with at least five consecutive annual observations. After all these adjustments, the sample for our core specification consists of 1,148 observations. Because four observations per country must be set aside for the construction of instruments, the core regression sample consists of 872 observations for 69 countries (20 industrial and 49 developing). As explained below, we also estimate regressions for the national saving rate and for private saving rates derived from a narrower definition of the public sector. For these regressions, the available sample comprises approximately 1,800 annual observations for 98 countries in the case of national saving rates and between 750 and 900 observations for 69 countries in the case of private saving rates, depending on the precise definition of the private and public sectors. 8 This sample coverage exceeds that of Edwards (1996) -who considers 32 countries-and Masson, Bayoumi, and Samiei (1995)-whose sample includes 61 countries. 4 As in other areas of empirical work, consumption studies face a steep tradeoff in the choice between closed-form solutions rigorously derived from (typically narrow) consumption-optimization models and atheoretical specifications encompassing a large number of consumption determinants. In line with the objectives of this paper, here we limit our attention to international studies using panel data and based on the latter approach.
5 Full details on data sources are given in the companion paper by Loayza et al. (1998a) . 6 The reason is that minor changes in the computation method (such as regarding the time within each year at which prices and public debt are measured) can result in huge changes in the adjusted saving measures.
7 As a robustness check, we worked with an alternative bound of 75% annual inflation, which reduced the number of observations discarded (14 instead of 49) and lead to estimates very similar to those reported in the paper, but at the cost of reduced precision. A second robustness check (presented in the section on alternative samples in the main text) consisted in restricting the sample so that the data points for each variable lie within four standard deviations from the respective mean. The corresponding estimation results are quite similar to those obtained with the 50% inflation bound. In turn, raising the threshold for each variable to five standard deviations leads to estimates and precision analogous to those obtained with the 75% inflation bound. 8 In some variants of the basic specification, actual sample sizes are smaller (as reported at the bottom of tables 4 through 8) due to the more-limited data availability on some of the additional regressors.
Finally, note that these panel data sets are heavily unbalanced, with the number of time-series observations varying considerably across countries. The top panel of table 1 provides information as to the composition of the core regression sample per decade and development stage. Developing countries account for over half of the total number of observations, and the 1980s is the decade most heavily represented in the data.
The precise definition of saving that we use also deserves comment. As in Loayza et al. (1998b) , for the nation as a whole our basic income measure is gross national disposable income (GNDI), equal to GNP plus all net unrequited transfers from abroad. 9 Gross national saving is then defined as GNDI minus consumption expenditure, with both measured at current prices.
In turn, for the private sector we implement four alternative measures of disposable income and gross saving. These follow from the definition chosen for the public sector (that is, consolidated central government or broad public sector) and from whether the private and public income and saving figures are adjusted or not for capital gains and losses due to inflation. We respectively label the four alternatives that result as CU (unadjusted data corresponding to the central government definition), CA (same as CU but after adjusting for inflationary capital gains and losses), PU (unadjusted data corresponding to the public sector definition of the government), and PA (inflation-adjusted PU data).
Notice that by construction the CA and CU configurations lump local governments and public enterprises together with the private sector. In turn, the PA and PU definitions of the public sector correspond to either the general government or, when available, the consolidated nonfinancial public sector, inclusive of public enterprises. Hence, of these four alternatives, the analytically preferable one is clearly PA. This is the private saving definition on which we base our core regression and most of our experiments. In contrast, most empirical studies use the CU measure, which is more readily available but analytically problematic.
In each case, gross private saving is computed as the difference between gross national saving and the relevant definition of gross public saving. Gross private disposable income (henceforth, GPDI) is likewise measured as the difference between GNDI and gross public disposable income, which is itself equal to the sum of public saving and public consumption. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations for the five saving ratios (national and the four alternative definitions of private saving). We report the full-sample correlations as well as their cross-sectional counterparts. As expected, the correlations are quite high in all cases (between 82% and 97%), with the correlations between the national saving ratio and the private saving ratios being the lowest. The five saving ratios also look very similar in their descriptive statistics (with a mean of approximately 20% and standard deviations of 8%). The table also highlights the wide dispersion of private saving ratios, which range from a minimum of Ϫ25% (Zambia, 1985) to a maximum in excess of 46% (Singapore, 1984) .
B. Empirical Specification
We adopt an encompassing approach based on reducedform linear equations. This allows us to include a broad range of saving determinants. For dependent variables, we use both private and national saving ratios (to gross private and gross national disposable income, respectively), although we concentrate on the former. We focus our attention on a core set of regressors selected on the basis of analytical relevance (as well as data availability); however, we also 
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THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS examine the empirical role of a number of less-standard saving determinants. 10 Following previous literature, our core regressors include a standard group of income-related variables, namely the (log) level and the rate of growth of real per capita disposable income, and the terms of trade. To ensure cross-country comparability of real income figures, we convert the local-currency, constant-price GNDI and GPDI data using World Bank Atlas exchange rates averaged over 1965-1994. In addition, our basic regressors include both price and quantity financial variables. The latter are the ratio of M2 to GNP, as standard indicator of financial depth, and the domestic (in national saving regressions) or private (in private saving regressions) credit flow relative to income, to capture consumers' access to borrowing. 11 The price variable is the real interest rate, defined as ln
It is calculated using two alternative measures of inflation: the current rate and the average of current and one-periodahead inflation. This yields two alternative real interest rate measures, of which our preferred one is that using the averaged forward-backward inflation just described; however, we also present empirical experiments using instead current inflation.
As conventional, we attempt to capture Ricardian effects in private saving equations by including as regressor the public saving ratio, measured in a way consistent with the definition of private saving under consideration; however, we also report some experiments adding the public investment/income ratio. In turn, demographic factors are represented by the old and young-age dependency ratios as well as the proportion of urban population in the total. Finally, we attempt to capture precautionary saving effects related to macroeconomic uncertainty adding the inflation rate ln (1 ϩ ) among the regressors. In this regard, we follow a rather voluminous literature in which the inflation rate has been used as a proxy for price uncertainty (Deaton (1977) ) and, more generally, macroeconomic instability (for example, Fischer (1993) ).
We perform additional empirical experiments using measures of trend and temporary income and the terms of trade, as well as measures of income uncertainty, constructed from our data. For this purpose, we use the time-series procedure introduced by Maravall and Planas (1999) . This procedure yields separate series for the trend and temporary components of real income and the terms of trade. Combining the respective trend and temporary components, we can construct one-step-ahead forecasts of the original variables. The dispersion of the corresponding one-step-ahead forecast errors provides a measure of the volatility of the respective innovations and hence the desired measure of uncertainty. We use the square of the forecast error as the measure of dispersion. Table 3 presents basic descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations (full sample and cross section) on the private (PA) saving ratio and the core explanatory variables.
C. Econometric Issues
The estimation procedure needs to tackle three issues. First, rather than distort the available information by phase averaging using an arbitrary phase length (such as computing five-or ten-year averages), we choose to work with the original annual data in order to retain all the information. This, in turn, means that we need to use a dynamic specification in order to allow for inertia, which is very likely to be present in the annual information. Inertia in saving rates can arise from lagged effects of the explanatory variables on saving. Thus, considering a dynamic specification allows us to discriminate between short-and long-run effects on saving. 12 Second, some of the explanatory variables in the core specification above (such as the real interest rate and real income growth) are likely to be jointly determined with the saving rate; therefore, we must allow and control for the joint endogeneity of the explanatory variables. Third, we must also allow for the possible presence of unobserved country-specific effects correlated with the regressors.
To address these issues, our empirical analysis is based on generalized-method-of-moments (GMM) estimators applied to dynamic models using panel data. These estimators allow us to control for unobserved country-specific effects and potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables. 13 Before we proceed, we must clarify the extent to which we control for joint endogeneity. Our panel estimator controls for endogeneity by using ''internal instruments,'' that is, instruments that are based on lagged values of the explanatory variables. Through this method, we can relax the assumption that the explanatory variables are strictly exogenous; however, we cannot allow for full endogeneity of the explanatory variables. To be precise, we must assume that the explanatory variables are weakly exogenous, which means that they can be affected by current and past realizations of the saving rate but must be uncorrelated with future realizations of the error term. Conceptually, weak exogeneity does not mean that future saving rates cannot be 10 The limited availability of good-quality annual information across countries on pension systems and measures of income inequality prevents us from including these variables in our core specification.
11 Because stocks are typically measured at the end of the year, we compute our ratios to income using the average of the current and previous year stocks (the latter having been brought to current year prices). Flows are in turn obtained as differences of stocks for two consecutive years.
12 While seldom considered in empirical studies, saving inertia can arise directly from consumption habits and even from consumption smoothing. For example, with a quadratic utility function (Hall (1978) ), if income follows an AR(1) process, then saving will also be AR(1). In our sample, the first-order autocorrelation coefficient of the private saving rate is 0.88. 13 The generalized-method-of-moments (GMM) estimator was proposed by Chamberlain (1984) ; Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988); Arellano and Bond (1991) ; and Arellano and Bover (1995) . It has been applied to cross-country studies by, among others, Caselli, Esquivel, and Lefort (1996) , Easterly, Loayza, and Montiel (1997) , and Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza (1998) . For a concise presentation of the GMM estimator, see chapter 8 of Baltagi (1995) .
WHAT DRIVES PRIVATE SAVING ACROSS THE WORLD?
correlated with current realizations of variables such as income growth or the interest rate (as would be predicted by most forward-looking models). Rather, weak exogeneity means that future innovations (or unforeseen changes) to the saving rate do not influence previous realizations of the saving determinants. We believe that, in concept, this assumption is not particularly restrictive; furthermore, we can statistically examine its validity through several specification tests, as explained below.
The following is a brief presentation of our preferred methodology. Consider the following dynamic, reducedform, saving regression equation,
where s is the saving rate, X represents a set of variables that potentially affect the saving rate, represents a set of unobserved, time-invariant, countryspecific effects, ⑀ is the error term, and the subscripts i and t represent country and time period, respectively. 14 The usual method for dealing with the country-specific effect in the context of panel data has been to first-difference the regression equation (Anderson and Hsiao (1982) ). In this way, the country-specific effect is directly eliminated from the estimation process. First-differencing equation (1), we obtain
The use of instruments is required to account for two facts. First, differencing the saving regression introduces, by construction, a correlation between the differenced lagged saving rate and the differenced error term. Second, some of the explanatory variables, X, may be jointly endogenous with the saving rate. In particular, we would like to relax the commonly held assumption that all explanatory variables are strictly exogenous (that is, that they are uncorrelated with the error term, ⑀, at all leads and lags). Relaxing this assumption allows for the possibility of simultaneity and reverse causality, which are very likely present in saving regressions. As explained above, we adopt the assumption of weak exogeneity of the explanatory variables, in the sense that they are assumed to be uncorrelated with future realizations of the error term (Chamberlain (1984) ). In this presentation of the methodology, all variables are treated as weakly exogenous (with respect to ⑀). In practice, however, we treat some variables as strictly exogenous (again, with respect to ⑀); they are the young and old dependency ratios, the urbanization ratio, and the terms of trade. 
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Under the assumptions that the error term, ⑀, is not serially correlated, and that the explanatory variables, X, are weakly exogenous, the following moment conditions apply to the lagged saving rate and the set of explanatory variables 15
We use a consistent GMM estimator based on these moment conditions, and we label it the difference estimator. This estimator, however, has conceptual and statistical shortcomings. Conceptually, we would like to study not only the time-series relationship between the saving rate and its determinants but also their cross-country relationship, which is eliminated in the case of the simple difference estimator. Statistically, Alonso-Borrego and Arellano (1996) and Blundell and Bond (1997) show that, when the explanatory variables are persistent over time, lagged levels of these variables are weak instruments for the regression equation in differences. The instruments' weakness has negative repercussions on both the asymptotic efficiency and the smallsample bias of the difference estimator. 16 To confront these conceptual and statistical concerns, we use an alternative system estimator that reduces the potential biases and imprecision associated with the usual difference estimator (Arellano and Bover (1995) , Blundell and Bond (1997) ). The alternative estimator combines, in a system, the regression in differences with the regression in levels. The instruments for the regression in differences are the same as above (that is, the lagged levels of the corresponding variable), so that, the moment conditions in equation (3) and (4) apply to this first part of the system. For the second part of the system, the regression in levels, the instruments are given by the lagged differences of the corresponding variables. These are appropriate instruments under the following additional assumption: Although there may be correlation between the levels of the right-side variables and the country-specific effect in equation (1), there is no correlation between the differences of these variables and the countryspecific effect. This assumption results from the following stationarity property.
for all p and q (5)
for all p and q
Therefore, the additional moment conditions 17 for the second part of the system (the regression in levels) are given by the following equations. 18
We use the moment conditions presented in the above equations, and, following Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995) , we employ a GMM procedure 19 to generate consistent estimates of the parameters of interest.
The consistency of the GMM estimator depends on whether lagged values of the explanatory variables are valid instruments in the saving regression. 20 To address this issue, we consider three specification tests suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) , Arellano and Bover (1995) , and Blundell and Bond (1997) . The first is a Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions, which tests the overall validity of the instruments by analyzing the sample analog of the moment conditions used in the estimation process. Failure to reject 15 The assumption that the error term is not serially correlated can be relaxed and replaced by the assumption that it follows a finite-order moving-average process. In this case, the moment conditions must be modified accordingly. For example, if ⑀ is MA(1) (as it appears to be in some of our private saving regressions below), the moment conditions in equations (3) and (4) must be replaced by
) 16 As the variables' persistence increases, the asymptotic variance of the coefficients obtained with the difference estimator rises (that is, the asymptotic precision of this estimator deteriorates). Furthermore, Monte Carlo experiments show that the weakness of the instruments produces biased coefficients in small samples. This bias rises with the variables' over-time persistence and the importance of the country-specific effect and declines with the size of the time-series dimension. An additional problem with the simple difference estimator relates to measurement error, namely, differencing may exacerbate the bias due to errors in variables by decreasing the signal-to-noise ratio. (See Griliches and Hausman (1986) .) 17 Given that lagged levels are used as instruments in the differences specification, only the most-recent difference is used as an instrument in the levels specification. Using other lagged differences would result in redundant moment conditions. (See Arellano and Bover (1995).) 18 Equation (7) and (8) give the appropriate moment conditions when the error term, ⑀, is serially uncorrelated. If, however, the error term follows a moving-average process of order 1, then the appropriate differences to be used as instruments must be lagged one more period. 19 We are grateful to Stephen Bond for providing use with a computer program (DPD version 8/8/96) to apply his and Arellano's estimator to an unbalanced panel data set. 20 In this paper, the moment conditions are applied such that each of them corresponds to all available periods, as opposed to each moment condition corresponding to a particular time period. In the former case, the number of moment conditions is independent of the number of time periods, whereas, in the latter case, it increases more than proportionally to the number of time periods. Most of the literature dealing with GMM estimators applied to dynamic models of panel data treats the moment conditions as applying to a particular time period. This approach is advocated on the grounds that it allows for a more flexible variance-covariance structure of the moment conditions. (See Ahn and Schmidt (1995) .) Such flexibility is achieved without placing a serious limitation on the degrees of freedom required for estimation of the variance-covariance matrix because the panels commonly used in the literature have both a large number of cross-sectional units and a small number of time-series periods (typically not more than five). We have, however, chosen to work with the more restricted application of the moment conditions (each of them corresponding to all available time periods) because of a special characteristic of our panel, namely, its large time-series dimension (well in excess of the time dimension usually encountered in micro panels). This approach allows us to work with a manageable number of moment conditions in such a way that the second-step estimates, which rely on estimation of the variancecovariance matrix of the moment conditions, do not suffer from overfitting biases (See Altonji and Segal (1994) and Ziliak (1997) .) the null hypothesis gives support to the model. The second test is the ''difference-Sargan'' test, which examines the null hypothesis that the lagged differences of the explanatory variables are uncorrelated with the residuals (which are the additional restrictions imposed in the system estimator with respect to the difference estimator). 21 The third test examines the hypothesis that the error term, ⑀ i,t , is not serially correlated or, if it is correlated, that it follows a finite-order, moving-average process. We test whether the differenced error term (that is, the residual of the regression in differences) is first-, second-, and third-order serially correlated. First-order serial correlation of the differenced error term is expected even if the original error term (in levels) is uncorrelated, unless the latter follows a random walk. Second-order serial correlation of the differenced residual indicates that the original error term is serially correlated and follows a moving-average process at least of order 1. If the test fails to reject the null hypothesis of absence of second-order serial correlation, we conclude that the original error-term is serially uncorrelated and use the corresponding moment conditions. 22
Measurement error: The discussion above has abstracted from issues regarding measurement error. It is likely, however, that most variables in our econometric model suffer from measurement error. Given that our model is dynamic, not only will errors in the explanatory variables cause biased estimation but also errors in the saving rate (the dependent variable). We can deal with measurement error through our instrumental-variable procedure, and we allow for measurement error of two kinds. The first type is mostly constant over time but specific to each country. We group this type of error with the unobserved country-specific effect and control for it accordingly. The second type of measurement error we allow for is the standard random error. If this is serially uncorrelated, it can be shown that the same lag structure for the instruments that control for endogeneity also deals with measurement error. If the random measurement error follows a moving-average process of order 1, then we need to use instruments lagged one more period than what would be necessary if there were no measurement error (or if it were serially uncorrelated). In practice, for all private saving rate regressions, we take the conservative approach of allowing for measurement error that follows an MA(1) process. (See footnote 22.) The specification tests for the validity of the instruments can also be used to assess whether the control for measurement error is appropriate.
IV. Estimation Results
We now present the estimation results for private and national saving rates. In each case, we organize our discussion around the core empirical specification introduced above. As noted earlier, the core regressors are the same for private and national saving rate regressions except for the fact that government saving is included only in private saving equations. We focus on the private saving rate and concentrate on the private saving measure that is most analytically sound. This is the measure that corresponds to the public sector defined broadly to include regional and local governments and (where possible) public enterprises, and adjusting for capital gains and losses due to inflation.
In order to test the robustness of the basic results and to enlighten their interpretation, we also conduct experiments along four dimensions. First, we employ alternative econometric techniques. Second, we use alternative samples: We break the world sample into OECD and developing-country subsamples, and we also present a world sample that excludes potential outliers. Third, we work with alternative definitions of private saving. And, fourth, we explore the importance of additional explanatory variables. Finally, we consider national saving regression results obtained under various econometric techniques.
Before proceeding to the detailed discussion of the results in tables 4 through 8, we note that the specification tests generally support our GMM-IV panel estimates. In all cases, the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term. Likewise, the tests of serial correlation reject the hypothesis that the error term is third-order serially correlated (and, in most cases, that it is second-order serially correlated), giving additional support to the use of appropriate lags of the explanatory variables as instruments for the estimation. For the core regression (table 4, column 6), we also conduct the Sargan-difference test, which, as explained above, tests the validity of the additional restrictions imposed by the system estimator relative to the difference estimator. In agreement with the conclusions of the other two specification tests, the Sargan-difference test does not reject the additional restrictions of the system estimator ( p-value 0.59).
Prior to presenting the results, we must clarify their interpretation. Our econometric methodology is designed to isolate the effect of the exogenous component of each explanatory variable on the saving rate. To the extent that our assumptions regarding the instruments employed in the GMM procedures are correct, we succeed in isolating the 21 Both the Sargan statistic and the ''difference'' Sargan statistic are asymptotically distributed as chi-square under the null hypothesis of validity of their respective instruments. The number of degrees of freedom of the Sargan test is equal to the number of overidentifying restrictions of the system estimator. The number of degrees of freedom of the ''difference'' Sargan test is given by the number of additional restrictions in the system estimator with respect to the difference estimator, that is, the difference between the number of overidentifying restrictions of the system estimator and that of the difference estimator. 22 However, if the test rejects the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation but fails to reject the null of absence of third-order serial correlation, we conclude that the original error term is MA(1) and, therefore, use the moment conditions appropriate to this case. As shown below, in the private saving regressions, we find in some cases evidence that the error term is MA(1) and, in others, that it is serially uncorrelated. For purposes of comparability across regressions, we adopt the conservative strategy of choosing the instrument sets for the regressions as if the error term were always MA(1). In the case of national saving, we find that the error term can be well characterized as serially uncorrelated, and we choose the instrument set accordingly.
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THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS effects going from the explanatory variables to the saving rate. The specification tests presented above support the validity of our instruments and thus allow us to draw inferences regarding the link between the exogenous component of policy and nonpolicy variables and saving rates. In the following, when we mention the effect of a given variable on the private saving rate, we are referring to the association between the exogenous component of that variable and the saving rate. Table 4 reports the results of the private saving rate regression using alternative estimators on the full sample and employing the core specification. While there are a number of similarities among the various estimates, our preferred estimation method uses the GMM system estimator. Hence, we first discuss the results obtained with this estimator (column 6) and then compare them with those obtained with alternative estimation methods.
A. Basic Results

Persistence:
The lagged private saving rate has a positive and significant coefficient, whose size (0.59) reveals a large degree of persistence. This, in turn, implies that the long-run effects of other private saving determinants are more than twice (2.44 times, to be exact) as large as their respective short-run effects, if all changes in these variables were permanent.
Income: Both the (log) level and the growth rate of real per capita private disposable income have a positive and significant effect on the private saving rate. As private agents become richer or their incomes grow faster, their saving rate increases. According to the estimated coefficients, an increase in income of 10% raises the private saving rate by 0.47 percentage points on impact. In turn, the estimated growth coefficient indicates that an increase in the income growth rate by one percentage point leads to a private saving rate increase of 0.45 percentage points in the short run. Lastly, a 10% improvement in the terms of trade increases the private saving rate by 0.74 percentage points in the short run.
In our basic regression specification, we estimate the effect of changes in income levels and growth rates and in the terms of trade; however, we cannot tell whether the estimated effects are due to permanent or temporary changes in these variables. We return to this issue below, when we attempt a decomposition of these variables into their permanent and temporary elements. In so far as the estimated coefficients represent the saving effects of temporary changes in income levels and growth rates, their positive sign is consistent with standard intertemporal consumption theories. If they represent the effect of permanent changes in income levels and growth rates, their positive sign must be explained by resorting to more recent theoretical developments. Thus, the positive income level effect would be consistent with models of subsistence consumption, while the positive income growth effect could be explained by a model featuring consumption habits or the lifecycle model, in which income growth accrues mostly across cohorts.
On the whole, the significant effects of income levels and growth rates imply that policies that spur development are an indirect but most effective way to raise saving. To the extent that a significant fraction of the increased saving is channeled into productive domestic investment in many countries (as suggested by the evidence in support of the comovement of saving and investment first underscored by Feldstein and Horioka (1980) ), successful growth policies may be able to set in motion a virtuous cycle of saving, capital accumulation, and growth.
Financial variables:
The real interest rate has a negative impact on the private saving rate, suggesting that its income effect outweighs the sum of its substitution and human-wealth effects. An increase of one percentage point in the real interest rate produces a private saving rate decline of approximately 0.25 percentage points in the short run. This result should be taken with some caution, however, in view of the strong negative correlation between inflation and the real interest rate (table 3), which suggests that our real interest rate measure may reflect more the action of nominal interest rate controls and financial repression than the intertemporal rate of substitution of consumers. In turn, our indicator of financial depth (M2/GNP) has a small and statistically insignificant impact on the private saving rate. Other experiments using instead credit ratios to measure financial depth led to similar results. Finally, the flow of private domestic credit relative to income carries a negative and significant coefficient, suggesting that the relaxation of credit constraints leads to a decrease in the private saving rate (in agreement with evidence given by Jappelli and Pagano (1994) ). When the flow of private credit rises by 1% of income, the private saving rate decreases by 0.32 percentage points on impact.
These results provide a bleaker view of the saving effects of financial liberalization than previous studies suggest, in both the price and quantity dimensions: Both higher interest rates and larger private domestic credit flows exert a negative effect on private saving rates. Although on the whole we do not find any positive, direct effects of financial liberalization on saving rates, considerable evidence shows that financial reform has a positive impact on growth (for example, Levine, Loayza, and Beck (forthcoming) ) and, through this channel, a potentially important indirect effect on saving rates.
Fiscal policy: A rise in the public saving ratio leads to a statistically significant decline in the private saving rate. Specifically, the private sector reduces its saving rate by 0.29 percentage points for each percentage point increase in the public saving ratio within the same year the policy change occurs. Over the long term, however, the offset coefficient rises to 0.69. Therefore, a permanent rise in public saving by 4% of GNDI will raise national saving by 2.8% of GNDI within a year, but only by some 1.2% of GNDI in the long term. The former result is at the low end of previous estimates, while the latter is at the upper end, so that allowing for inertia in saving helps reconcile some conflicting estimates found in the literature. (See López, SchmidtHebbel, and Servén (2000) .) While our point estimates fall short of unity, a Wald test of the null of full long-run Ricardian offsetting yields a p-value of 0.10, which provides some evidence against the Ricardian hypothesis but fails to reject it at conventional significance levels.
Demographic variables:
All three demographic variables under consideration-namely, the urbanization ratio and the young and old dependency ratios-have a significantly negative impact on the private saving rate. The negative effect of the urbanization ratio can be explained along the precautionary-saving motive: Lacking the means to diversify away the high uncertainty of their mostly agricultural income, rural residents tend to save a larger proportion of their income. The negative coefficients on the dependency ratios are consistent with standard lifecycle models of consumption. The null of equality of the estimated coefficients is rejected; the coefficient on the old dependency ratio is significantly larger than that on the young dependency ratio. This likely reflects the fact that the labor force effectively includes a nonnegligible proportion of the population under sixteen years of age (the cutoff point for the young dependency ratio) in many countries.
Both urbanization and the old-age dependency ratio are strongly positively correlated with per capita income (table 3), so that they contribute to dampen the positive effect of rising incomes on saving noted above. In turn, the negative saving effect of young-age dependency suggests that developing countries with young populations that aim at accelerating their demographic transition and speed up the decline in young-age dependency ratios may witness a transitory increase in their saving ratios before reaching the next stage of demographic maturity. At this stage, old-age dependency rises swiftly, and saving rates level off again.
Macroeconomic uncertainty:
As in much of the recent growth literature, in the core specification our proxy for macroeconomic uncertainty is the inflation rate. We find that a rise in inflation has a positive coefficient: A reduction of inflation by ten percentage points reduces the private saving by more than one percentage point through this channel. This suggests that increased macro uncertainty (regarding, for example, nominal incomes and future policies) induces 174 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS people to save a larger fraction of their income for precautionary motives. 23 While one might be tempted to conclude that inflation stabilization could have an adverse effect on saving, it is important to keep in mind that stabilization also affects saving through other indirect channels that are likely to more than compensate for any negative direct effect of inflation. In this regard, there is systematic evidence that lower inflation raises growth (see Fischer (1993) and Andrés and Hernando (1997) , among many other studies) and, as discussed below, the latter has a major positive effect on private saving. Further, the fiscal-adjustment component of macroeconomic stabilization also has an unambiguously positive effect on national saving, as noted above. Table 4 also presents results obtained with alternative estimation techniques. The first two columns present static OLS estimates, using respectively the cross-sectional data (country averages) and the pooled annual data. Both specifications are often encountered in saving studies. The third column adds the lagged dependent variable to the second. It is important to keep in mind, however, that OLS is likely biased and inconsistent in all three cases because it ignores unobserved country-specific effects and joint endogeneity of the explanatory variables. In the fourth column, the within estimator is used to control for country-specific effects, but still ignoring joint endogeneity. An additional problem already noted earlier is that the presence of a lagged dependent variable renders the within estimator inconsistent in short panels, although its fate in a heavily unbalanced panel such as ours is somewhat less clear. The fifth column presents the results obtained with the GMM estimator based on a regression in differences which, as explained earlier, deals with country-specific effects and joint endogeneity. However, the GMM difference estimator eliminates the cross-country variation of the data (like the Within estimator) and may suffer from small-sample bias due to the use of weak instruments. By contrast, the system GMM estimator in column 6 makes use of both cross-country and time-series information.
B. Alternative Estimators
In many cases, the results obtained with our preferred estimation technique (the GMM system estimator) are qualitatively similar to those obtained with the alternative estimators shown in table 4. All estimators yield positive effects of the (log) level and growth rate of real income and negative effects of public saving and the old dependency ratio, although the coefficients vary in size and statistical significance. Likewise, in all cases (with the obvious exception of the static OLS estimates), we find significant evidence of private saving inertia, although it's likely exaggerated in the pooled OLS estimates due to their lack of control for country-specific effects.
There are, however, some notable exceptions. For example, the use of time-series information (columns 2 through 6) reverses the parameter signs of the terms of trade and credit flows relative to those found in the cross-sectional OLS estimates. By contrast, cross-sectional information (columns 1 through 3 and 6) is needed to obtain a significant negative effect of the urbanization ratio. In turn, controlling for country-specific effects (columns 4 through 6) reverses the sign of the M2/GDP ratio from positive to negative. In this regard, however, notice that M2/GNP is likely to be a better proxy for financial depth in the cross-sectional dimension than in the annual time-series dimension, where it may reflect mostly other short-term factors like monetary policy. Finally, the sign and significance of the coefficients of the inflation rate and the interest rate do not show a clear pattern across alternative estimators.
C. Alternative Samples
In table 5, we present the GMM system estimates for alternative samples of countries, namely, the sample of less-developed countries (LDC) and the sample of industrial countries (OECD), in addition to the full-sample estimates already described. We also present estimates for a sample that excludes outliers without resorting to bounds on inflation. We obtain this sample by restricting the observations of each variable in the core specification to lie between four standard deviations from the respective mean. The estimated results for the restricted sample are quite similar to those obtained with the full sample (which, as explained above, imposes a 50% bound on inflation). We take this similarity as evidence that our core regression results are not driven by outlier observations and that the inflation bound is not distorting the estimation results.
Qualitatively, the estimates obtained on the subsamples of developing and industrial countries are broadly similar to their full-sample counterparts, but there are two important exceptions. First, surprisingly, the coefficient on the real interest rate is not significant for either the OECD or LDC samples, while it was significantly negative in the full sample. This again raises the suspicion that the accuracy with which real interest rates measure intertemporal prices varies across the two subsamples. 24 Likewise, M2/GNP is the other variable whose sign is not robust across samples: negative and insignificant in the full sample, positive and insignificant in the LDC sample, and significantly positive in the OECD sample.
The magnitude of the estimated coefficients also changes across samples. The level of private income and its rate of growth are always positively related to the private saving rate, but their estimated coefficients are smaller in the OECD (where the level effect is in fact insignificant, a pattern already found by Modigliani (1992) ) than in the LDC sample. This seems consistent with subsistence-consumption theories, which predict a higher impact of income and growth on saving rates at low levels of income. The size of the estimated coefficients of the demographic variables is uniformly smaller in the case of the OECD sample than in the LDC and full samples. This result likely reflects nonlinear saving effects of the demographic variables, as well as the greater homogeneity across OECD populations in terms of urbanization and age structure. The private credit flow ratio also carries a considerably larger coefficient in the LDC subsample than in the OECD subsample. This is possibly due to the fact that credit constraints in developed countries are mostly nonbinding; therefore, increases in private credit flows in these countries do not reflect improved credit availability.
Finally, it is puzzling that the coefficient on the public saving rate is found to be larger in the group of developing countries than in the OECD subsample. We would expect that the conditions for Ricardian equivalence to hold are more prevalent in industrial than in developing countries. The large estimated coefficient on the public saving ratio for the group of LDCs may reveal that, despite our best efforts, measurement error is partly driving the negative correlation between private and public saving rates. This is a likely possibility given that private saving was derived as the difference between national and public saving. Thus, any error in public saving would translate mechanically in an error of the opposite sign in private saving. If we assume the estimated public saving coefficient for the OECD sample as mostly free from measurement error, then we find a larger effect of public saving on national saving than reported above. A permanent increase in public saving of 4% of GNDI would lead to an increase in national saving of 3.6% of GNDI in the short run and 2.6% of GNDI in the long run. Interestingly, for both the industrial and developing country subsamples, Wald tests allow clear rejection of full long-run Ricardian offsetting, with p-values below 1%. Table 6 presents full-sample, system-GMM estimation results using the four alternative definitions of the public sector that were introduced earlier. Up to now, we have focused on the public sector definition that includes the general government and, when available, public enterprises; furthermore, the related saving and income data have been adjusted to account for the inflationary erosion of privately held public liabilities. The results of this core regression, discussed above, are reproduced in table 6, column 4, under the heading of ''PA.'' The other columns make use instead of the three alternative public-(and private-) sector saving measures introduced earlier corresponding to, respectively, unadjusted central government (CU, column 1), adjusted central government (CA, column 2), and unadjusted consolidated public sector (PU, column 3). 25 Performing this robustness check for alternative public-sector measures is important given that differences in empirical results across different studies have often been attributed to differences in the definition of public sector.
D. Alternative Definitions of the Public Sector
Surprising to us, the estimated results are remarkably robust across definitions of the public sector. Concerning the adjusted and unadjusted data, this is not all that striking given that we have dropped from the sample the observations that correspond to episodes of extreme inflation. In any case, table 6 shows only one exception that deserves discussion. 26 The estimated coefficient on public saving is larger in the central government regressions than in those corresponding to the consolidated public sector. In fact, the 25 The sources of central government data are different from those of public sector data. The former cover many more countries but fewer years (from 1970 on only). For comparability, all the regressions in the table use the same set of countries; hence, the central government-based saving regressions possess fewer observations. 26 The second exception is that M2/GNP has a positive and significant coefficient only in the regressions corresponding to the central government definition of the public sector. 
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''offset'' coefficient is approximately 25% larger in the case of the central government, so that, in the long run, it reaches 72% and 95% in the CU and CA specifications, respectively, in contrast with the 58% and 69% that result from the PU and PA estimates. The straightforward explanation of this result is that there is a larger degree of offset between the central government and other public-sector levels (provincial and state governments and public enterprises) than there is between the consolidated public sector and the private sector. This in turn implies that studies of Ricardian equivalence based on a central-government definition of the public sector tend to overstate the public-private saving offset.
E. Additional Explanatory Variables
In table 7, we add other potential private saving determinants, excluded from the core set of explanatory variables because they are either less commonly used in the literature or not well justified conceptually. We consider each variable in turn. The first one is the current account deficit (relative to private disposable income). While popular in the literature, the current account deficit is a somewhat dubious regressor, as it is jointly determined with saving in countries and/or at time periods characterized by unrestricted access to net foreign lending, and is exogenously determined otherwise. Thus, it is difficult to interpret the results obtained with this variable when using samples that combine observations on the two regimes (like ours and most others). In our case, we try to correct at least in part for these problems by treating the current account ratio as an endogenous variable in our GMM-IV procedure. The resulting estimates show that an increase in external saving (that is, a worsening of the current account deficit) is partly offset by a decline of private saving; the offset coefficient is on the order of 33% in the short run and 60% in the long run. At face value, the implication is that an increase by, say, 2% of GNDI in the exogenous component of foreign lending reduces private saving by approximately 1.2% of GNDI in the long run. With the important caveat just noted, this agrees with the standard view that external saving acts as a substitute rather than as a complement to domestic private saving. The remaining coefficients show little change, although that on income growth becomes smaller.
The second variable is the ratio of public investment to private disposable income. If public investment is perceived to be just like public consumption, its estimated coefficient would be of equal magnitude but opposite sign as that for the public saving ratio. If it is viewed as productive investment, its coefficient would be zero. What we obtain, however, is a significantly negative coefficient. This suggests a somewhat puzzling complementarity between public and private goods, in the sense that an increase in government investment leads to an increase in private consumption. As before, the rest of the parameter estimates show little variation.
The third variable is the proxy for income uncertainty mentioned earlier, constructed as the standard error of the one-period-ahead forecast error from a univariate timeseries model for income based on Maravall and Planas (1999) . 27 Although its estimated coefficient has the positive sign expected from the precautionary saving motive, it is not statistically significant, which likely reflects the rudimentary nature of our constructed proxy.
Fourth, we consider the effect of the oil shocks on private saving by including dummy variables for the years 1973, 1974, 1979, and 1980 . Although the estimated coefficients for the four years are found to be negative (reflecting the predominance of oil importers in our sample), only those for the years 1973 and 1974 are significantly so. 28 The remaining coefficients are mostly unchanged. This result indicates that, for the typical (oil-importing) country, the temporary income loss due to a rise in oil prices leads to a decrease in saving rather than a downward adjustment of consumption. 27 Using instead the variance of the forecast error to measure uncertainty yielded similar results. 28 Other year dummies, when added to the regressions, were likewise insignificant. In columns 5 and 6, we analyze the effects of the permanent and temporary components of, respectively, private disposable income and the terms of trade. Note that the decomposition procedure causes the loss of some observations which are used to estimate the underlying univariate models. Remarkably, in both cases we find that the size of the coefficient on the temporary component is much larger than that of the permanent component (although the latter maintains a positive sign). In the case of income, neither coefficient is significant, while both are in the case of the terms of trade. 29 The larger impact on the saving rate of temporary income is consistent with consumption smoothing by forward-looking agents. In turn, the fact that the permanent component of the terms of trade retains a significant positive coefficient (although much smaller than 29 Other experiments using instead the Hodrick-Prescott decomposition yielded qualitatively similar results: larger coefficients on the temporary than on the permanent components of both variables (the latter was in fact negative for the terms of trade), but in this case all significantly different from zero. 1973, 1974, 1979, and 1980 . Although all four coefficients were found to be negative, only those for the years 1973 and 1974 were significant. The coefficient reported in the table corresponds to the 1974 dummy variable.
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THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS that on the temporary component) might reflect the lack of access to external borrowing that many developing countries suffered during much of our sample period. Finally, in column 7 we reexamine the effect of the real interest rate on saving by using in its calculation the current inflation rate, rather than the average of the current and next-year inflation rates, as has been done up to now. The sign and significance of the real interest-rate coefficient remain as before, though its magnitude is larger. The remaining parameters are mostly unaffected, but the inflation rate now adopts a negative, though insignificant, coefficient, reflecting the strong correlation (Ϫ0.70) between the ex-post real interest rate and the inflation rate. This suggests that the larger coefficient on the former variable may be capturing in part the positive effect of inflation on the private saving rate found earlier. Table 8 presents the full-sample results for national saving rate regressions obtained with alternative estimators. The table is analogous to table 4, on the private saving rate, except for the fact that, in the national saving rate regressions, we do not include the public saving ratio as an explanatory variable. The maintained assumption in the national saving rate regressions is that the public saving rate is driven by the same determinants as the private saving rate (excluding public saving itself, of course).
F. National Saving Rate
In spite of the much larger data samples used here, close comparison between these results and those obtained with the private saving rate reveals a remarkable similarity in terms of sign and significance of the estimated coefficients. Indeed, our preferred (GMM-system) estimates are basically the same for the private and national saving rates, with three differences of some relevance. First, the real interest rate still carries a negative coefficient, but it is not significant in the national saving rate regressions; second, the effect of the level of income is much larger in the case of the national saving rate; and, third, the degree of persistence is lower for national than it is for private saving rates. In turn, the results obtained using alternative estimators are also quite similar for both dependent variables. We take this broad similarity, along with the fact that the theoretical literature provides a framework for the analysis of private saving decisions, as supportive of our choice to concentrate on the empirical determinants of the private saving rate.
V. Concluding Remarks
Private and national saving rates display very large variation across countries and over time. This paper has explored empirically the roles of policy variables and other factors in these large saving disparities. The paper extends the literature in several dimensions. First, it makes use of a new data set on saving and related macroeconomic variables, whose coverage in terms of countries and years is considerably broader than those used in previous literature. Second, it explores different dimensions of saving-of the private sector and the nation. Third, it tries to correct for issues such as simultaneity and unobserved country-specific effects, making use of instrumental variable estimators based on internal instruments. Fourth, it performs extensive robustness checks to changes in estimation procedures, country samples, private-saving measures, and empirical specifications.
The main empirical findings reported in the paper are:
Private saving rates show inertia; that is, they are highly serially correlated even after controlling for other relevant factors. The effects of a change in a given saving determinant are thus fully realized only after a number of years, with long-run responses estimated to be more than two times larger than short-run (within a year) ones. Private saving rates rise with the level and growth rate of real per capita income. The influence of income is larger in developing than in developed countries. In developing countries, a doubling of income per capita is estimated, other things equal, to raise the long-run private saving rate by some ten percentage points of disposable income. Likewise, a rise of one percentage point in the growth rate raises the private saving rate by a similar amount. The overall implication is that policies that spur development are an indirect but effective way to raise private saving rates. The predictions of the lifecycle hypothesis are supported in that dependency ratios have a negative effect on private saving rates. The negative impact of an increase in the old-dependency ratio is more than twice as large as that of the young-dependency ratio. The precautionary motive for saving is supported by the finding that inflation-conventionally taken as a summary measure of macroeconomic volatility-has a positive impact on private saving, holding other factors constant. Fiscal policy is a moderately effective tool to raise national saving. An increase in public saving by, say, 4% of GNDI will raise national saving by 2.8% of GNDI within a year, but only by some 1.2% of GNDI in the long term. The evidence points against full Ricardian equivalence. The direct effects of financial liberalization are largely detrimental to private saving rates. First, enhanced credit availability reduces the private saving rate.
Second, larger financial depth does not raise saving, and nor do higher real interest rates.
These results are, in general, robust to the use of alternative saving definitions, regression specifications, and data subsamples.
